Minutes 2026-02-19

Meeting Minutes 2026-02-19

Qubes presentation by Simone

• Traditional OS security is not ideal
  • No isolation by default
  • Assumes trusted kernel
  • Only one compromised app can take over the system
  • Easy lateral movement for hacks
• Qubes:
  • Type 1 hypervisor as desktop OS
  • Everything is isolated in VMs
  • 1 VM per
  • This contains compromised apps within the part of the system they are used on
  • Based on Xen hypervisor
• Architecture:
  • Xen hypervisor, hardened
  • Dom0: management VM
  • DomU: unpriveleged VMs
• Dom0:
  • NOT HOST
  • Priveleged
  • Gets most hardware by default
  • Window Manager/GUI is in Dom0
  • No networking
  • Enforces color coding on
• AppVMs:
  • Unpriveleged
  • Usually Debian or Fedora
  • Runs user applications
  • Video sent to Dom0
  • Input sent from Dom0
  • Stateless by default: /home persists but root filesystem doesn't
• TemplateVMs:
  • Snapshot-based templates
  • Contains installed packages
  • No direct internet access (update by proxy, updates all AppVMs)
• DisposableVMs:
  • Similar to AppVms, but self-destructs
  • Useful for viewing untrusted files or sites
  • Also useful to get a fresh environment
  • Automatic creation and deletion
• Virtualization:
  • PVH by default
  • Can be fully virtualized (FVH) as an option
  • Qubes Windows Tools (QWT) to work with Windows better
  • Can use any OS
• Networking:
  • Dedicated VM for network
  • Hardware passthrough
  • Firewall is between AppVMs and hardware
  • Impossible to sniff network activity from the VMs
• Peripherals:
  • Dedicated USB VM
  • Can forward USB devices to Qubes
  • Isolates malicious USBs
    • Can spin up a disposable VM to investigate
  • Audio/Bluetooth have similar systems
• GUI:
  • Each VM renders own windows
  • Dom0 composites video together
  • Per-VM color coding (makes popups harder to fall for)
  • Each VM has an emulated GPU
  • Anything that requires a real GPU will need hardware passthrough
• VM Communication:
  • qrexec lets Dom0 control VMs
  • "Send to Qube" to share files between VMs
  • "Open URL in Qube"
• Whonix/TOR:
  • Whonix is built into Qubes OS
  • Whonix runs everything only through TOR
    • Really slow
  • Whonix-gateway: runs TOR only
  • Whonix-workstation: routes traffic through gateway, disposable
• Updates/Trust:
  • sys-whonix: updates over TOR
  • sys-net: updates everything else, managed by Dom0
• Performance:
  • So many VMs has a cost
  • Most VMs are idle, and Xen reallocates unused memmory
  • Overhead with CPU performance, RAM, and I/O
  • Recommended at elast 32GB RAM, and an SSD
  • Requires hardware virtualization (VT-x/VT-d, AMD-V, IOMMU)
  • Qubes in VM is unsupported

• Useful for journalists, developers, and the paranoid
• Reduces risk
• Trains visual/habitual security

• NOT FOR BEGINNERS
• Not meant for games
• Firmware malware still a problem
• Annoying and takes a lot of work to run

• Demo:
  • Lots of VMs on the system
  • VMs for:
    • Discord
    • Work
    • Personal
    • Vault
    • Untrusted
    • USB devices
    • Firewall
  • Disposable VM can be created to inspect a USB safely
    • Popups, other sneaky things are both isolated and easy to see
  • All Qubes can be seen on the Qube Manager